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practitioners” 
(2004) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 69  
This article asks whether medical practitioners' duty of care to their patients will 
encompass participation in the HealthConnect shared electronic records initiative. 
Medico-legal aspects of the HeathConnect scheme relating to the nature of shared 
electronic health record summaries (SEHRS) are examined, focusing on their function 
as an element of patient care and their ultimate purpose. The analysis is based on the 
premise that an incomplete and hence inaccurate shared electronic health record 
summary is clinically and legally more perilous than no record at all.  
 
Medical practitioners owe their patients a non-delegable duty to "exercise reasonable 
care and skill in the provision of professional advice and treatment".1 The standard of 
reasonable care is determined by reference to "that of the ordinary skilled person 
exercising and professing to have that special skill".2 The scope of the medical duty of 
care includes keeping adequate medical records. But should the notion of a medical 
record extend to "shared electronic health record summaries" (SEHRS)? The phrase 
"shared electronic health record summaries" refers to health-related information 
summaries about an individual that a hospital, physician or health care practitioner 
would collect at the point of care and electronically transfer to the HealthConnect 
repository to be "shared" with participating entities.  
 
The origins of the HealthConnect scheme go back to 2000 when the National 
Electronic Health Records Taskforce, in its Report to Health Ministers titled A Health 
Information Network for Australia, recommended the creation of a nationally 
coordinated and distributed system of electronic health records. This scheme, having 
gone through a number of permutations, is now called HealthConnect.3 Its 
implementation is projected to commence in 2004.4 
 
The HealthConnect scheme is not dissimilar to a number of overseas initiatives that 
aim to create national, State or provincial electronic networked databases of medical 
records.5 These schemes build on pilot projects initiated in the United States in the 
1960s that aimed to improve inter-professional communications through the use of 
computerised electronic health records linked across an organisation.6 Today, 
probably all hospitals, clinics, allied facilities, private funds and the Health Insurance 
Commission operate different kinds of computerised patient record systems. Personal  
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health information in an identifiable form is transmitted electronically among 
hospitals, doctors, health and diagnostic facilities, third party payers and 
governmental regulators – each of which may use the data for different purposes.7 
However, apart from the Health Insurance Commission and private health insurance 
funds, which process electronic medical and pharmaceutical data nationally, 
electronic records created by other organisations in the health sector tend to operate as 
discrete systems.  
 
The national HealthConnect project is much more ambitious.8 According to Mr Tony 
Abbott, the Federal Minister for Health and Ageing:  
The new integrated HealthConnect system will provide secure electronic 
health records for consumers wherever they go in the health system, providing 
the basis for improved decision-making and delivering streamlined care.9 
The salient points of the HealthConnect system are as follows:  
• an "opt-in" scheme in which a very wide variety of "health service providers" 
can choose to participate; 
• participating medical practitioners, with the patient's permission, to create a 
SEHRS based on the practitioner's own consultation record;  
• the patient to decide: 
• the content of SEHRS; and 
• access to SEHRS by "primary" and "secondary" users; 
 
• SEHRS forwarded to and stored at a designated collection point; it appears 
that the Health Insurance Commission may be the collecting agency;  
• access by other authorised "secondary" and "tertiary" users to the SEHRS 
library to be via their existing systems or via the internet. 
 
If it is to fulfil the promise of providing "the basis for improved decision-making", the 
HealthConnect system will need to be embraced by all medical practitioners 
nationwide.  
 
However, many legal, ethical and recordkeeping issues inherent in the HealthConnect 
scheme are yet to be resolved. The resolution of these issues will determine whether 
medical practitioners as a profession will participate in the scheme. This article briefly 
examines the concept of the HealthConnect scheme and the function of the shared 
electronic health record summaries, focusing on the reasons for and against the 
imposition of a duty of care on medical practitioners to participate in the scheme. In 
seeking to establish whether such duty will arise, the article discusses the distinction 
between medical records and SEHRS, the issues of integrity, accuracy and currency in 
the latter form of record, as well as their benefits and purposes.  
The HealthConnect system 
According to the Financial Business Model for HealthConnect, the concept of an 
integrated national health information network is akin to a library service:  
with users adding, searching and retrieving documents from the library subject 
to a set of access rules. In this case the documents in the library will be 
consumer HER [health electronic records].10 
The HealthConnect project is guided by a set of Design Principles. The first two 
principles state:  
1. The consumer shall determine who has access to their HER data and the 
duration of that access; and 
2. The provider together with the consumer, shall determine what clinical data 
is recorded for each specific health event.11 
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Hence, subject to the individual health consumer's permission,12 her or his personal 
health-related information will be collected in a standard, electronic format at the 
point of care, such as at a hospital or a general practitioner's clinic. This information 
would take the form of "event summaries", rather than the more extensive notes that a 
health care provider may keep. With the patient's consent, these SEHRS would be 
stored at a central, local or regional collection point as health data directories and at 
the federal level as health provider directories. The SEHRS would be accessible via a 
"secure network" to "primary users". Primary users will be consumers (patients) of 
"health services who may wish to review and add to their health records".13 The 
consumer can also authorise access by providers of health services, including doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists, allied health, community health, Aboriginal health and public 
health professionals, where the provider is "seeking information about a consumer 
they are treating".14 Though unarticulated in the documentation, the system will also 
allow the consumer to authorise her or his lawyers to access the HealthConnect 
system for litigation purposes.  
 
Additionally, access, under special protocols, will be available to "secondary users" 
who are loosely divided into clinical and administrative "researchers" (including 
clinical, health service, administrative, statistical, consumer, epidemiological) seeking 
information to assist clinical decision-making, and "managers", including 
administrators, planners, policy makers, and organisations such as the Health 
Insurance Commission and private health insurance funds that may seek information 
to assist with management decision-making.15 Users will be able to access the SEHRS 
library via their existing networking systems or "a general purpose computer interface 
(Web Browser)".16 
 
It is of concern that despite the imminent date for commencement, a detailed working 
model for collection and distribution of the SEHRS within the HealthConnect scheme 
is yet to be worked out. In 2000, the National Electronic Health Records Taskforce, in 
its Report titled A Health Information Network for Australia,17 suggested a nation-
wide monolithic model called HINA, which in 2002 was renamed HealthConnect. 
The Report contains a number of "clinical" examples illustrating the project's socio-
economic foundations. The Report provides three scenarios of why a system of shared 
electronic health records summaries is urgently needed. The first of these scenarios 
concerns an incompetent patient with a closed head brain injury who, following an 
accident at work, is brought by ambulance to an emergency ward. The emergency 
personnel "cannot even put a name to their consumer until he regains 
consciousness",18 and as a result "make an avoidable mistake", which results in an 
adverse drug reaction. One may ask, how, without knowing the patient's name, could 
emergency personnel access his electronic health records under the HealthConnect 
scheme? Yet the issue is of great importance, for as Dr Pascal Gelperowicz, who 
works on an emergency ward, explained:  
The majority of emergency physicians working in any emergency 
department would describe access to past medical history and records 
as crucial. Many situations necessitate rapid access to medical records 
as there is often no family member or corroborating medical historian 
to fill this role. What is less apparent though is the need for these 
services regularly; let me provide three examples. The first is the 
patient who presents to emergency with chest pain and we are querying 
whether it is cardiac in nature – an ECG is performed which is 
abnormal and may reflect changes which are from a previous cardiac 
event or this presentation; rapid access to a previous ECG would allow 
swift implementation of cardiac  
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treatment if required. A second example is the patient who says "I'm on three 
medications – one for my heart, one for blood pressure and another one for 
blood thinning" (a very common occurrence) – these presentations are often 
out of hours with no access to the patient's GP, pharmacist or family members; 
patients are notoriously bad at providing accurate data on medications and past 
medical events through no fault of their own. They may not understand 
procedures or findings of those procedures and there is the risk of loss of 
accuracy of history as time goes on. The final example represents a patient 
minority but an important minority and that is the drug-seeking or "ulterior 
motive" patient who presents a fictitious presentation and past history to 
negotiate personal gain; access to records on these patients would be 
extraordinarily useful.19 
Thus, at least in the emergency ward, there is a need for quick access to diagnostic 
tests, past medical history, including allergies, and medication lists. Undoubtedly, an 
integrated network of accurate and comprehensive electronic health records accessible 
from many locations has the potential to improve the quality of care.20 
Will medical practitioners have a legal duty to create and use SEHRS? 
Under the Australian federal system, the responsibility for health care is vested in the 
States and Territories. They have the power to enact legislation to control the 
registration of medical practitioners, and to impose conditions for the practice of 
medicine without infringing the Commonwealth Constitution.21 This means that 
medical practitioners could be compelled to participate in the HealthConnect scheme 
by State and Territory legislatures. The Commonwealth Parliament will only have the 
power to regulate this aspect of medical practice if the High Court of Australia 
considers that participation in HealthConnect is an incident of medical service 
through administrative procedures within the scope of s 51(xxiiA) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution.22 However, apart from legislative compulsion, would 
medical practitioners have a common law duty to participate in providing and utilising 
information contained in SEHRS? Their duty to participate will be conditional on the 
records generated through the HealthConnect scheme being accurate, reliable and 
trustworthy.23 
Difference between medical records and SEHRS 
Medical records created by the practitioner have always formed an integral part of 
clinical care in the Hippocratic tradition.24 A medical practitioner has a duty to create 
a record at the time of each professional encounter with the patient, and should do so 
on a continuing basis. It has been noted that medical records, through their style, 
content and sequence of information, reflect their creator's clinical reasoning 
processes.25 They also serve as an aide-memoire for the purpose of the patient's 
medical care and referral, as well as for practice management and teaching.  
Though characterised by their confidential nature, when disclosed under compulsion 
of law as part of the litigation process, clinical records also provide evidence of the 
processes of reasoning that lead to provisional or final diagnosis,26 as well as 
decisions regarding treatment and advice provided to the patient. For example, 
lawyers acting for a client in a medical malpractice suit are expected to examine her 
or his clinical records before deciding whether to take on a case.27 The information 
contained in the records enables them to assess the plaintiff's health status before the 
impugned  
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medical intervention. As a general rule, the case will only be pursued if the records 
show that the condition is probably due to medical negligence by a doctor or a 
hospital rather than a pre-existing illness or condition.28 
 
Under the scheme, once the SEHRS is forwarded to HealthConnect, only the patient29 
and HealthConnect (or its commercial subcontractors) will have the right to alter its 
content. The issue of the authenticity, integrity and veracity of SEHRS as probative 
evidence will, no doubt, provide excellent earning opportunities (and headaches) for 
litigation lawyers.  
 
However, apart from personal injury litigation, in the context of clinical practice, 
there are major reasons why it is doubtful that SEHRS will be of benefit in primary 
patient care. First, there is the probability of incompleteness and possible lack of 
integrity. Although the majority of patients will consent to include all information that 
a doctor would extract into the SEHRS template from her or his clinical notes, others 
may wish to withhold such vital information as abortion, depression, a psychotic 
episode or alcohol/drug dependence. Patients' choices regarding the content of 
SEHRS cannot be predicted in advance nor retrospectively ascertained. Second, 
summaries – by definition – are not sufficiently detailed to serve as a basis for 
medical treatment decisions (apart from emergencies where no other data are 
available), practice management and evidence of accountability. They are neither 
designed nor intended to replace proper clinical records and letters of referral created 
by the doctor. Third, the HealthConnect scheme is an opt-in system. Naturally, the 
comprehensiveness and thus the usefulness of SEHRS will be compromised without 
full participation by health care providers.  
Will medical practitioners have a common law duty to participate in the Health 
Connect scheme? 
The major policy argument for imposing a duty to participate in the scheme is that 
absence of medical records might pose a risk of misdiagnosis, allergic reactions, and 
sometimes of overdosing. However, it is difficult to imagine why, in private practice, 
a physician would be expected to consult SEHRS rather than full records. In an 
emergency ward, assuming their integrity, currency and accuracy, the existence and 
ready access to SEHRS containing lists of results from previous investigations may 
alleviate the pressure of undertaking some tests for some patients. For example, 
instant access to SEHRS containing details of previous ECGs could alleviate the risk 
of misdiagnosis for a patient with an abnormal ECG, but an unconscious patient with 
a closed head injury would require brain imaging even if a brain scan had been taken 
two hours before the accident.30 In the most severe and urgent cases, medical 
management is often not predicated on previous tests – in the sense that everything is 
done in a situation of high acuity irrespective of earlier tests, though obviously not in 
complete isolation. As a general rule, a previously normal test would not preclude 
repeating the test on the basis that something in the patient's condition may have 
changed, necessitating a casualty department presentation; tests may be falsely 
negative and require repeating.31 Thus, even with access to SEHRS, prudence (and the 
risk of malpractice litigation) would dictate repetition of the tests. There is also a 
technical question about access for patients who have not or are unable to consent, 
and where the unconscious patient's name is unknown.  
 
The question whether participation in the HealthConnect scheme falls within the 
scope of the medical duty of care is conditional on the degree of acceptance by the 
profession of this scheme as a recognised element of competent medical practice. In 
all States of Australia32 (though not as yet in the  
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Territories),33 professionals, including medical practitioners, are not liable in 
negligence if they act in a manner that is widely accepted in Australia by peer 
professional opinion as competent professional practice. Courts will not intervene 
with the peer opinion, unless it is "irrational"34 (in Victoria and Western Australia the 
threshold for the court's intervention is "unreasonable").35 The legislation also 
provides that "widely accepted" peer professional opinions can differ, and "do not 
have to be universally accepted to be considered widely accepted".36 
 
Peer opinion regarding clinical acceptability or otherwise of the HealthConnect 
scheme will be influenced by the attitudes of the Australian Medical Association and 
specialist Colleges. These organisations will only embrace the HealthConnect scheme 
if the information contained in SEHRS is accurate, complete, up-to-date and 
confidential. Moreover, participation in the scheme should not be burdensome for 
practitioners,37 in the sense that their therapeutic benefit should outweigh the time 
spent entering the data, operating the HealthConnect system and reviewing SEHRS.38 
In short, if the reasonable practitioner would not have undertaken the burden of 
participation in the scheme, no such duty to do so will arise.39 
Accuracy, integrity and currency of SEHRS 
As noted above, medical practitioners will only have a professional duty to participate 
in the scheme if the accuracy, integrity and currency of the data contained in SEHRS 
is assured. The nationwide scope of the project raises technological and legal 
concerns regarding the issue of accuracy. Provided they are authorised by the patient, 
not only hospitals, day clinics, doctors, nurses and pharmacists but personal trainers, 
chiropractors, Chinese medicine practitioners, herbalists, naturopaths, osteopaths, 
iridologists and faith healers will have an input into the SEHRS through their own 
disparate "feeder" systems. Assuming that the messaging and routing infrastructure 
works flawlessly and all the data are successfully collected into the repositories, there 
is still no transparent way of ensuring that the information is accurate, current and has 
not been tampered with. The technology is yet to develop processes that would verify 
whether the SEHRS data amassed in the repository are properly integrated and 
represent an accurate set of health delivery services in a summary form.40 Moreover, 
despite some claims by private companies involved with providing software 
infrastructure for  
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nationally networked health records systems outside of Australia,41 the present 
technology is not as yet capable of reviewing, prioritising, systematising and sorting 
out chronology (not merely the date but the sequence) of health service events and 
medications for every patient. For example, the provision of separate templates for 
recording different kinds of services and events will not be sufficient to sequence, 
prioritise and triage the SEHRS of a patient who visits a cardiologist, a surgeon, a 
faith healer, a herbalist and a pharmacist on the same day.  
 
If the scheme were to be widely adopted by practitioners, in order to avoid liability in 
negligence the participating medical practitioner would be expected to study each 
SEHRS before making provisional diagnosis or deciding treatment options. Would he 
or she be also expected to make an audit to ascertain that the record is authentic? Even 
without the duty to audit, unless a SEHRS equivalent of triage is externally provided, 
retrieval of pertinent information from volumes of SEHRS accumulated over the 
years will be a time-consuming process effectively precluding the use of this kind of 
patient data in an emergency ward, and imposing a considerable burden on private 
professional practice.  
 
Perhaps one of the most significant factors in consideration of the duty to participate 
is the fact that the purpose of SEHRS is external to the therapeutic relationship 
between the patient and the attending medical practitioner. These summaries are not 
intended to replace clinical notes, but are created jointly by the health care provider 
and the patient for the purpose of dissemination amongst future users of 
HealthConnect authorised by the patient. As envisaged by HealthConnect, patients, 
rather than doctors, will have ultimate control over the content of each SEHRS. 
Moreover, only the patient can determine who should have access to SEHRS.42 It is 
simply impossible to predict how many patients will withhold or change information 
relating to their health status or drug and alcohol abuse.  
 
The case of Bruce v Kaye [2004] NSWSC 277 may serve as an illustration of a 
patient whose control over a SEHRS would make it unreliable. The case involved 
Kristy Bruce. Her mother's uterus ruptured in the early stages of labour, and she was 
born by an emergency caesarean section on 21 March 1989 at the Royal Hospital for 
Women in Sydney, suffering from cerebral palsy. She brought action by her tutor43 
against specialist obstetrician, Dr Kaye, alleging that he negligently permitted the 
term of her mother's pregnancy to continue beyond 42 weeks.  
 
The mother used five different surnames: Chevelle, Winbank, Anderson, Owen and 
Bruce. On 17 October 1988, she consulted the defendant as Ms Chevelle, for the first 
time. According to Dr Kaye's record, which was not disputed, Ms Chevelle told him 
that this was her fourth pregnancy and that she had delivered three children. In fact, 
she had had seven pregnancies, two of which had been terminated and one 
miscarried.44 More importantly, she did not disclose to Dr Kaye that on 3 March 
1988, under the surname of Winbank, she had an abortion by curettage at the Royal 
Hospital for Women.  
 
Also, for reasons of her own, Ms Chevelle informed Dr Kaye that she recently moved 
to Sydney from interstate. This was untrue. Moreover, neither during the first 
consultation nor subsequently did Ms Chevelle disclose to Dr Kaye that between June 
and October 1988, under different names, she consulted six different medical 
practitioners for prolonged obstetric consultations, and underwent five pregnancy 
tests. Ms Chevelle also did not tell Dr Kaye about the ultrasound test which she 
underwent at the Royal Hospital for Women on 22 August 1988 under the name of 
Sharon Anderson. That test showed that she was 12-13 weeks pregnant. Instead, she 
indicated that she was unsure of her dates. To enable him to estimate the date of 
confinement,45 Dr Kaye arranged an ultrasound examination on  
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19 October 1988. Soon after that second ultrasound Ms Chevelle went to Canberra, 
and consulted yet another medical practitioner, Dr Buchanan, who also arranged for 
an ultrasound. On her return to Sydney, she saw Dr Kaye, but did not inform him of 
her obstetric consultation in Canberra or the third ultrasound. Having systematically 
withheld relevant information, the plaintiff argued in court that Dr Kaye should have 
consulted her hospital records, which would have revealed, though under different 
names, both the results of the August ultrasound and notes about the March 
termination of pregnancy.  
Rejecting this proposition, Grove J stated (at [24]):  
The report of the August ultrasound and notes about the termination of 
pregnancy in March 1988 have been accumulated in the Royal Hospital for 
Women file. It was suggested in cross-examination that the defendant, as a 
visiting medical officer with rights to introduce patients into the hospital, 
could have accessed the file. I expect he could but I cannot conceive any 
reasonable cause for him so to do. If a patient gives no history of any such 
procedure or examination, it is not the duty of a medical practitioner to 
conduct an investigation into whether he has been deceived. There was no 
clinical or other reason for the defendant to go to the hospital files.  
 
The patient in Bruce v Kaye46 may have been at the extreme end of the spectrum. 
However, it is not difficult to imagine that some patients will withhold relevant 
information from SEHRS, or capriciously bar some medical practitioners from 
accessing them. Patients will have to be advised that in proceedings against a medical 
practitioner for negligence, their decision to either withhold data from or limit access 
to SEHRS may be considered contributory negligence on the basis that they had failed 
to take precautions against the risk of harm through absence of relevant information, 
which a reasonable person would take.47 If the defendant medical practitioner can 
establish that a plaintiff has been warned that lack of information about a condition or 
treatment may result in misdiagnosis or ineffective treatment, the practitioner may 
succeed in establishing the legal defence of voluntary assumption of risk.48 
 
Judging by the statements of Grove J regarding a medical practitioner's scope of duty 
with regard to consulting medical records, the existence of the HealthConnect scheme 
will not place doctors under a legal obligation to investigate whether anything in the 
patient's SEHRS has been withheld, altered or deleted. The problem is that the scheme 
may not, as the Minister asserted, "provide secure electronic health records for 
consumers wherever they go in the health system". Rather, it may provide a false 
impression of security with Swiss cheese health record summaries.  
Will HealthConnect provide "the basis for improved decision-making and 
delivering streamlined care"? 
There would be a strong argument for compelling medical practitioners to participate 
in the HealthConnect scheme if SEHRS were shown to improve clinical decision-
making and enable the delivery of streamlined care. The National Health Records 
Taskforce in its Report provided a scenario illustrating of how such improvements 
would be achieved. The scenario involved a recommendation by a general practitioner 
for admission of a 70-year-old woman with fever and chest pain to a public hospital 
and her subsequent admission to its Accident and Emergency (A&E) department. 
According to the Taskforce's Report, the woman was visiting her family from 
interstate, and was "not known to the (male) general practitioner".  
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Apparently, due to the time of admission and breakdown in communications with the 
general practitioner's locum, pathology and radiology tests were repeated twice. The 
Report scenario is written in the present tense:  
She is asked about allergies and remembers that she had a rash after taking 
some cold tablets several years ago, but cannot remember any further details. 
She is prescribed intravenous penicillin and re-hydration. Treatment is 
commenced in the A&E department but produces a rapid deterioration. She 
becomes shocked and requires resuscitation. She is admitted to the intensive 
care unit. (Cost of two days in the ICU approximately $3,000 …) Alternative 
antibiotics are prescribed, she recovers and is discharged home after seven 
days in hospital.  
The Report provides an alternative scenario with the HealthConnect scheme49 in 
operation:  
A new patient presents to the general practitioner complaining of fever and 
chest pain. She is a participant in HINA and gives her permission for him to 
access her personal health information via HINA. Her full medical history 
appears on the doctor's computer describing her general good health with a 
possible allergic episode to Amoxicillin some 15 years ago. The general 
practitioner refers her for pathology and radiology and sends an admission 
request to the admitting officer at the local hospital by secure e-mail. She then 
makes her way to the hospital. On her arrival, the admitting doctor reads the e-
mail, examines her and checks the results of the pathology and radiology that 
have already been forwarded to the hospital. With her permission, he retrieves 
her medical history and notes the history of a possible allergic incident. He 
commences an alternative antibiotic and admits her to the ward. She returns 
home in three days.50 
The HINA or HealthConnect system notwithstanding, it would be unusual for a 
general practitioner who has arranged both the patient's hospital admission and the 
diagnostic tests not to request that the results be forwarded to the hospital either by 
fax or e-mail. In this scenario, the patient from interstate gives her permission first for 
the general practitioner and then the admitting hospital doctor to access her SEHRS. 
As a result, both become aware of her past allergy to penicillin. But what if she, 
having given consent for access only within her State, were now unable to provide 
consent for the SEHRS access in Victoria? What if, over 15 years, the file with 
reference to the "allergic episode to Amoxicillin" became corrupted or lost? And even 
if the file were available, how long would it take to search through 15 years' worth of 
SEHRS files?  
Confidentiality 
Another issue raised by such searches is the patient's right to confidentiality within a 
therapeutic relationship and patients' interests in controlling access to sensitive 
medical information. While searching through the SEHRS files for records of 
allergies, the attending doctors may, by virtue of the process, read about the woman's 
past history of rape and attempted suicide, which is irrelevant to the diagnosis and 
treatment of her present condition (though it might be vital in other circumstances). 
As proposed, technological inability to categorise the SEHRS data by relevance to the 
patient's current condition, which is inherent in systems like the HealthConnect 
scheme, will pose a dilemma for patients.51 
 
Patients can agree to the future disclosure of sensitive information contained in 
SEHRS on the understanding that the access to it by medical personnel will have to be 
virtually unrestricted.52 Alternatively they can exercise control over such data either 
by excluding it from SEHRS or restricting access to it, with the knowledge that their 
decision may lead to the risks of harm the scheme is supposed to prevent. Legally, the 
determination of the scope of medical duty of care involves balancing the probability 
and seriousness of suffering harm – such as an anaphylactic shock as a result of an 
allergy to penicillin – against the burden of taking precautions to avoid that risk as 
well as the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm. In the context of 
the scenario, the  
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suggested precaution against the risk of allergic reactions is the participation in the 
HealthConnect scheme and medical utilisation of SEHRS. The social utility argument 
for declining such participation would assert that many patients may be embarrassed 
and distressed by the disclosure of sensitive health-related data for reasons other than 
the treatment of their particular medical condition.  
 
In view of their dubious benefits, the uncertainty of their content and problems their 
retrieval and disclosure would impose in the context of primary patient care, 
professional medical bodies will be slow to endorse participation in the 
HealthConnect scheme as an integral part of competent medical practice.  
SEHRS databases 
Finally, the fundamental question that goes to the issue of medical duty of care is the 
major purpose of the scheme and the utilisation of SEHRS outside the clinical 
encounter.  
Resolution of the issue of legal ownership of SEHRS will be vital to the question of 
which legal entity will have the right to disclose and sell the SEHRS databases in 
whole or in part to third parties. State, Territory and Federal Governments can already 
access large electronic databases relating to health;53 therefore access to the SEHRS 
repositories will merely add to their already existing capacity for mapping clinical 
care patterns in order to develop economic and social policies for health and disease 
management. The SEHRS databases will, however, further enhance governments' 
ability to both check patients' entitlements to medications at concession rates,54 and 
scrutinise the performance of individual health care providers, particularly in relation 
to the containment of health care costs. In the field of genomic research, large datasets 
(phenotypic data) that comprise longitudinal histories of health and illness of 
individuals may lead to a better understanding of the molecular underpinnings of 
disease.55 Depending on the definition of "research" and the stringency of statutory 
privacy protection, private marketing research corporations may be able to purchase 
information collected in SEHRS to build patients' drug or health facility profiles and 
on-sell these personal profiles to pharmaceutical and private health care corporations 
so they can target more precisely the discrete niche market. Moreover, the information 
contained in SEHRS databases will be very useful to law firms which endeavour to 
target potential clients and induce them to join class actions against health care 
providers and pharmaceutical companies.56 Employers and insurers may wish to 
access SEHRS databases as a prerequisite to hiring and rehiring or providing an 
insurance cover for both providers and patients.57 
 
Consequently, the various purposes for which these records are going to be created 
should be factored into determining the scope of medical practitioners' duties of care 
in relation to HealthConnect. It seems that there is more that one purpose for the 
introduction of this scheme. The information contained in SEHRS will no doubt be 
streamlined, but improving the quality of care by reducing replication of tests, and 
minimising the risk of adverse events due to lack of health care information are not 
the major reasons for the creation of the HealthConnect scheme. This being so, it will 
be difficult to persuade medical practitioners that participation in the HealthConnect 
scheme is within the scope of their professional duty of care.  
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Postscript 
Since this article was submitted for publication, the Federal Health Minister, Tony 
Abbott, announced that from July 2004, a Medicare smart card readable by a 
computer58 will be available to residents of Tasmania (followed by South Australia 
and northern Queensland, then other parts of Australia).59 The proposals are very 
vague. Apparently, the scheme may be run on an opt-in basis with patients-cum-
customers buying the access to a smart health card system run by a private 
company.60 The cards will initially include the patient's name, possibly a digital 
photo, health records such as drug allergies, and whether the holder is a registered 
organ donor. This information will be accessible to hospitals, doctors, pharmacists, 
Medicare offices and ambulances teams. However, the smart card's microchips are 
capable of containing much more health information, and, according to the Minister:  
From next year Tasmanians will be able to use the cards at Medicare offices to obtain 
information about their immunisation records, see if they have qualified for the 
Medicare "safety net" and how much they have spent on pharmaceuticals.61 
The Minister's statement suggests that the major function of the smart card will be to 
provide more particularised information to the Health Insurance Commission. This 
means that the Medicare number will almost certainly be embedded as the unique 
identification number. Presumably, for reasons of privacy, every card holder will also 
have a pin number to activate it, which might present difficulties in accessing the 
information when the patient is incompetent. As with the SEHRS, holders of the 
smart card will be able to control and delete any information from the electronic file.62 
It is uncertain whether the new proposals will mean that the HealthConnect scheme 
has been discarded in favour of the smart card, or whether the two systems will 
operate side by side. However, it might be that the government has realised that, apart 
from costs, ethical, legal and practical deficiencies of SEHRS would make their use 
unacceptable in medical practice.  
*   MA, PhD, LLM; Associate Professor, School of Law, Deakin University, Burwood, 
Victoria.  
Partly based on a paper presented at the Symposium on "Shared Electronic Health 
Records: Ethical, Legal and Recordkeeping Perspectives", part of the Australian R
Council Discovery Grant, under the auspices of Deakin University, Melbourne
2004.  
Correspondence to: Dr Danuta Mendelson, School of Law, Deakin University, B
Highway, Burwood, Vic 3125, Australia; e-mail: danuta.me
esearch 
, 23 April 
urwood 
ndelson@deakin.edu.au.  
1   Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 489.  
2   Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 at 586; Rogers v 
Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 489; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 58(a); Wrongs Act 1
(SA), s 40(a).  
936 
3   er" when quoting from or describing the HealthConnect 
4
The author uses the term "consum
system, but refers to "patients" in her own analysis.  
   th and Ageing 
a will 
and 
On 10 March 2004, the Australian Government Department for Heal
announced that the whole-of-State implementations in Tasmania and South Australi
commence in July 2004, then moving to implementation in larger States, with Queensl
as a priority: http://www.health.gov.au/medicareplus/ viewed 6 July 2004.  
5   tives" 
12 JLM 26 (above).  
Terry NP, "Electronic Health Records: International, Structural and Legal Perspec
(2004) 
6   Anderson JG and Aydin CE, "Evaluating Medical Information Systems" in
(ed), Ethics, Computing and Medicine (Cam
 Goodman KW 
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998) p 
7
58.  
   JLM Mendelson D, "Travels of a Medical Record and the Myth of Privacy" (2003) 11 (2) 
136.  
8   The HealthConnect scheme is being implemented through Medicare and MediConnec
The MediC
t. 
onnect initiative, launched by the Australian Government in 2003, will form a 
ame, address, 
r. 
ce Commission. 
rd. 
 
 this – 
database with electronic records containing personal information such as n
date of birth and Medicare card or Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) file numbe
The electronic MediConnect records will be stored with the Health Insuran
"Consumers will be able to have medicines information added to or taken off their reco
Consumers will be able to choose who they want to view or use their MediConnect
information. Doctors, pharmacists and authorised hospital staff will be able to do but 
they must have consumers' consent before they can do 
so": http://www.mediconnect.gov.au/what.htm#info viewed 6 July 2004.  
9   http://www.mediconnect.gov.au/what.htm#info viewed 6 July 2004.  
10   
11
Financial Business Model, v09 (July 2003) pp 15-16, para 3.2.5.  
   
2
HealthConnect Draft Systems Architecture v0.9, p 16, para 3.1.2.1.  
1    http://www.healthconnect.gov.au/ viewed 6 July 2004.  
13   Financial Business Model, v09 (July 2003) p 15, para 3.2.5.  
14   Financial Business Model, v09 (July 2003) p 15, para 3.2.5.  
15   Financial Business Model, v09 (July 2003) p 15, para 3.2.5.  
16   Financial Business Model, v09 (July 2003) pp 15-16, para 3.2.5.  
17   A Health Information Network for Australia; Report to Health Ministers by the National 
pdf
Electronic Health Records Taskforce (July 
2000): http://www.health.gov.au/healthconnect/pdf_docs/ehr_rep.  viewed 6 July 2004. 
18   A Health Information Network for Australia; Report to Health Ministers by the N
Electronic Health Records Taskforce (July 2000), p 92, Box
scenarios": 
ational 
 5.2, "Contrasting 
http://www.health.gov.au/healthconnect/pdf_docs/ehr_rep.pdf viewed 6 July 
19
2004.  
   
20
Pascal Gelperowicz, personal communication, 5 May 2004.  
   Alpert SA, Health Care Information: Access, Confidentiality and Good Practice, in 
Goodman, n 6, p 88.  
21   British Medical Association v Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201 at 253 per Latham CJ; 
cf Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.  
22   General Practitioners Society v Commonwealth (1980) 145 CLR 532 at 560 per Gibbs J.  
23   Iacovino L, "Trustworthy Shared Electronic Health Records: Recordkeeping Requir
and HealthConnect" (2004) 12 JLM 40 (above).  
ements 
24   Hippocratic Writings (Chadwick J and Mann WN (trans), Lloyd GER (ed)) (Peng
Books, Ha
uin 
rmondsworth, 1983).  
25   Young DW, "What Makes Doctors Use Computers? Discussion Paper" (1984
of the Royal Society of Medicine 663, discussed by Anderson an
) 77 Journal 
d Aydin, n 6.  
26   Diagnosis involves scientific interpretation within a nosological paradigm of such fact
data as symptoms of the patient's complaint,
ual 
 signs (objective manifestations of disease) 
27
and diagnostic tests.  
   2002 
T), Pt 14.2.  
See eg Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), ss 198J – 198N; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
(AC
28   All Australian jurisdictions provide some kind of statutory threshold that a plaintiff must 
meet before being able to claim damages for non-economic loss at common law: see
Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s
 Civil 
s 99A, 99B; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 16, 17, 
vil 
, ss 9, 10; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 61, 62; Wrongs Act 
4, 26. 
29
17A; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 52; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss 27, 28; Ci
Liability Act 2002 (WA)
1958 (Vic), s 28LB; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), ss 2
   2.1.  
30
Design Principles, HealthConnect Draft Systems Architecture v0.9, p 16, para 3.1.
   
31
Pascal Gelperowicz, personal communication, 5 May 2004.  
   
32
Pascal Gelperowicz, personal communication, 5 May 2004.  
   
at (at the 
sional 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5O(1): "A person practising a profession (a 
professional) does not incur a liability in negligence arising from the provision of a 
professional service if it is established that the professional acted in a manner th
time the service was provided) was widely accepted in Australia by peer profes
opinion as competent professional practice." See also Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 
), s 41(1); Civil Liability Act 
33
22(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 59(1); Wrongs Act 1936 (SA
2002 (WA), s 5PB(1); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22(1).  
   es, and 
mmon law as 
The Northern Territory is yet to undertake partial codification of negligence principl
the Australian Capital Territory has legislation regarding standard of care but not 
specifically regarding professionals. Thus both Territories are governed by co
stated in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 487 and Naxakis v Western General 
Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269.  
34   ivil 
 Act 2003 (Qld), s 22(2); Wrongs Act 1936 (SA), s 41(2).  
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5O(2); C
Liability
35   Under the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 59(2), the court will not rely on peer pro
opinion, if it considers the opinion "unreasonable". Under the Civil Liability Act 200
(WA), s 5PB(4), the court will intervene in circumstances where "the health professional 
acted or omitted to do something which is, in the circumstances of the particular 
unreasonable that no reasonable health professional in the he
fessional 
2 
case, so 
alth professional's position 
36
could have acted or omitted to do something in accordance with that practice".  
   ), s 5O(3), (4); 
), (4); Wrongs 
37
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22(3), (4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22(3), (4); Wrongs Act 1936 (SA), s 41(3
Act 1958 (Vic), s 59(3), (4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5PB(3), (5).  
   he 
e burden on the 
or which 
38
In a suit in negligence against a medical practitioner relating to harm occasioned by t
failure to utilise SEHRS, the plaintiffs would have to address, inter alia, th
defendant medical practitioner of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm, f
they claim damages.  
   ecords: Opportunities for and Challenges of 
39
Powsner S, Wyatt J and Wright P, "Medical R
Computerisation" (1998) 352 Lancet 1617.  
   uld 
ertake 
the burden imposed by the precaution is taken into account: Civil Liability 
 2003 
ct 1936 
ct 
This is because the required standard of care is that which a reasonable person wo
exercise in the profession. In determining the precautions such a person would und
to avoid risk, 
Act 2002 (NSW), ss 5B, 5C; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(1), (2); Civil Liability Act
(Qld), s 9(1), (2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), Pt 1A, Div 2; Civil Liability A
(SA), s 32(1), (2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(1), (2); Civil Law (Wrongs) A
2002 (ACT), s 43(1), (2).  
40   Korpman RA, Uniform Data Standards for Patient Medical Record Informati
Electronic Exchange of Such Information, Testimony to the
on and the 
 National Council on Vital and 
#Section-IIHealth Statistics, 8-9 December 1998: http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/981208tg.htm
viewed 6 July 2004.  
41    Report Gingrich N and Linn L, An Electronic Health Record Should be Created in 2004: A
on the English Electronic Health Record, Center for Health 
Transformation: http://www.healthtransformation.net/Projects/suppdocs/EHR2-29-
04Final.pdf viewed 6 July 2004.  
42   g-term survival of 
43
The power to exercise actual control regarding access, integrity and lon
the SEHRS will be vested in HealthConnect.  
   t as 
 party) was her sister rather than her 
For an undisclosed reason, Kirsty Bruce's tutor in law (a court-appointed person to ac
the next friend or guardian ad litem for a disabled
mother.  
44   Bruce v Kaye [2004] NSWSC 277 at [21].  
45   ed the 
em to have 
The second ultrasound was also performed by Dr Warren, but this time the mother us
name of Chevelle, and was referred by a different doctor. Dr Warren did not se
realised the identity of the patient.  
46   In the event, Grove J held that Dr Kaye was not negligent in allowing the pregn
proceed to 42 weeks, and that the sole cause of the plaintif
ancy to 
f's damage was "the catastrophic 
kness 
ll of Ms Chevelle's uterus, which might have been caused by an 
s abortions: Bruce v Kaye
uterine rupture … which had started to manifest itself at Ms Chevelle's residence 
provoking the urgent dash to the hospital". The rupture was probably due to the wea
in the posterior wa
inadvertent perforation in one of her previou  [2004] NSWSC 
277 at [91], [98].  
47   In some jurisdictions, contributory negligence can defeat the claim: Civil Law (Wrongs) 
Act 2002 (ACT), s 47; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5S; Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld), s 24; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 63.  
48   Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; Civil Liability Act 1
(SA), ss 36, 37; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 5F, 5G; Civil Liability Act 2002
ss 15, 16; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5M-P; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 
16; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 53, 54.  
936 
 (Tas), 
13 – 
49     
50
The Report uses the old acronym HINA (Health Information Network for Australia).
   lia: Report to Health Ministers by the National 
sts using 
_rep.pdf
A Health Information Network for Austra
Electronic Health Records Taskforce (July 2000) p 175, Box 13.1 "Estimated co
scenarios of adverse 
events": http://www.health.gov.au/healthconnect/pdf_docs/ehr  viewed 6 July 
51
2004.  
   
52
Alpert SA, Health Care Information: Access, Confidentiality and Good Practice in 
Goodman, n 6.  
   nfidence, Privacy and the Paterson M, "Disclosing Health Information Breaches of Co
Notion of the "Treating Team"" (2003) 10 JLM 460.  
53   Magnusson R, "Data Linkage, Health Research and Privacy: Regulating Data Fl
Australia's Health Information System" (2002) 24 Syd L Rev 5.  
ows in 
54   Patient Privacy: Possible Benefits but Carter M, "Integrated Electronic Health Records and 
Real Dangers" (2000) 172 MJA 28.  
55   Detmer DE, "Building the National Health Information Infrastructure for Personal H
Health Care Serv
ealth, 
ices, Public Health and Research" (2003) 3 BMC Medical Informatics 
and Decision Making 1: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/3/1#IDA0015H 
viewed 6 July 2004.  
56   See eg the web site of the American firm of Parker & Waichman, which now conduct
general e-mail marketing campaigns suggesting that persons who ha
s 
ve taken medications 
r disorder; such as Zyprexa (olanzapine) to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia and bipola
Roaccutane (isotretinoin, known as Accutane in the United States) for treatment of severe 
nodular acne contact them: http://www.yourlawyer.com/ viewed 6 July 2004. The a
to target individual patients would be a very enticing prospect to such firms.  
bility 
57   
ile with the 
e 
d in 1995 
ions". 
58
Schwartz PM, "Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information" (1997) 
76 Tex L Rev 1 at 18. Schwartz, citing the American study of Linowes DF, A Research 
Survey of Privacy in the Workplace (April 1996, unpublished manuscript, on f
Texas Law Review), notes that "[a]ccording to one empirical study of privacy in th
workplace in the United States, over one-third of Fortune 500 companies surveye
admitted to using the medical records of their personnel in employment-related decis
   lth 
niversal 
In 1996, a report by the Council of Australian Governments' Working Group on Hea
and Community Services proposed an enhanced Medicare smart card called the "u
patient record" (ie, a universal identifier). The smart card would record basic data each 
time a patient dealt with the health and/or welfare system: Bryce S, The State of 
Surveillance 
at http://www.newdawnmagazine.com/Articles/State%20of%20Surveillance.html vie
6 July 2004.  
wed 
59   Wroe D, "Medicare Smart Card on the Way", The Age, 25 June 
2004: http://theage.com.au/articles/2004/06/24/1088046223596.html?oneclick=true 
viewed 6 July 2004.  
60   AAP, Minister Wants Health Smartcards, news.com.au, 21 June 
2004: http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,7865385%255E15306,00.html
viewed 6 July 2004.  
61   
06,00.html
AAP, Minister Wants Health Smartcards, news.com.au, 21 June 
2004: http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,7865385%255E153
viewed 6 July 2004.  
62   AAP, Minister Wants Health Smartcards, news.com.au, 21 June 
2004: http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,7865385%255E15306,00.html
viewed 6 July 2004.  
 
